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24 APRIL 1952

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BW AND THE KOREAN WAR


As the bacteriological warfare campaign continues to subside, both in volume and intensity, attention to Korea and the Korean war per se returns to more normal levels. The following factors characterize the propaganda development during the past two weeks:

1. Chinese, Soviet and North Korean transmitters continue to decrease the number of references to BW, and attention to the charges is now at the lowest point since the campaign began. No effort is made to sustain the campaign by using events which would seem to lend themselves to effective exploitation.
2. Within the scope of the generally reduced number of references, Peking especially continues to stress scientific and eyewitness testimony, plus legal precedents, to document American guilt, while insisting that the bacteriological criminals will not escape punishment for their crimes.
3. Peking is making a special effort to prove that the Americans are taking great pains to keep U.N. troops ignorant of the fact that BW is being waged in Korea and Northeast China. This effort, considered together with other signs of defensiveness, suggests concern over the failure to convince the world that the charges are true, and sensitivity concerning interpretations that the campaign is a sign of Communist weakness.
4. The sharp reduction in the number of references to biological warfare has been accompanied by the reappearance of themes that provided run-of-the-mill comment on the war before the BW charges were introduced.
5. Peking makes pointed references to "unwarranted optimism" in Western circles concerning the possibility of a truce through a compromise on the major points at issue. Such statements reflect a new and uncompromising note which has been absent for several months in comment on the truce talks.

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Percentage of
Total Broadcasts

SINO-SOVIET ATTENTION TO BACTERIAL WARFARE



*Comment and newsitems beamed to foreign audiences; **does not include the main Peking Home Service programs; #includes all Soviet commentaries, 95% of which are beamed to foreign audiences; ##includes all newsitems broadcast to home audiences, many of which are broadcast regionally.

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BW References Continue Sharp Decline: As indicated by the chart on the opposite page, Moscow and Peking continue to devote less and less attention to the BW charges and attendant comment, and this decline is equally marked in Pyongyang's propaganda.* Chinese regional stations during the week 14-20 April devote only 1.5 percent of all items to BW or its ramifications and the topic has now become secondary to the discussion of general agricultural problems, the three anti's and the five anti's campaign and the preparations for May Day. During the second week of the SURVEY period, just as many items were concerned with the recent appearance of Volume II of Mao's collected works as with BW. Biological warfare still leads all other subjects in Peking's international services, but as indicated in previous surveys the stress remains upon the documentation of American guilt. Pyongyang's attention remains focused on efforts to combat American-disseminated disease and in echoing Soviet and Chinese themes. The recently noted tendency for Pyongyang to originate themes has not been in evidence this past week.

No Effort Made to Exploit Pertinent Events: The consistent decline in the level of attention has been accompanied by an apparently purposeful failure to make use of events which seem to lend themselves to effective propaganda exploitation in connection with the campaign. Thus, the appeal of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers' Council in Vienna to the U.N. received only cursory mention, and a similar appeal of the Conference in Defense of Children, also meeting in Vienna, was given textual treatment without elaboration. Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal Judge Mei Ju-so's appeal to his Tribunal colleagues was not played up, although he stressed his willingness to appear as a "sworn witness" to the truth of the charges "in the event of an international tribunal being organized at some future date to try the war criminals."

Peking Continues to Document American Criminality: The voluminous report of the IADL investigating committee, which presented a detailed, annotated and notarized catalogue of alleged American atrocities in Korea since June 1950, and the report of the Chinese investigatory commission which presented an equally exhaustive brief of U.S. crimes in Northeast China was widely reported by Peking but accorded comparatively meager attention by Moscow and Pyongyang, which limited themselves to piecemeal broadcasts of the text without supplementary elaboration.

* For an analysis of Moscow's present development of the BW campaign see FBIS SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS, 17 April 1952.

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More than either Moscow or Pyongyang, Peking continues to spell out the fate awaiting the perpetrators of biological warfare. PEOPLE'S DAILY declared on 17 April that "no tricks will save the germ-war criminals from the justice of the people. They stand in the shadow of a new Nuremberg." Such statements appear frequently from Peking; they are less usual from Moscow and Pyongyang, a difference which has been apparent since the campaign began.

At the present stage of the denunciatory drive, all three transmitters continue to report indignant protests from all over the world. In addition they insist that American germ warfare has been effectively dealt with in Korea and that the Americans' desperate gambit to win victory through inhumanity has been a dismal failure. Pyongyang continues to exhort its own people to intensify their sanitation efforts and a complex epidemic-control organization has been established on what seems to be a permanent basis.

The NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY on 18 April made its first reference to a member of the "Chinese Volunteers epidemic-prevention team in Korea." Although Peking early in the campaign reported the clamorings of Chinese medical men and scientists to go to Korea to aid the local population in their fight against BW, this is apparently the first admission that such medical teams are actually in Korea.

Japanese Threatened by BW Campaign: Although Moscow, Peking and Pyongyang have on occasion spoken of the possibility that the BW criminals might become the victims of their own criminality, an item broadcast by Moscow on 14 April, and repeated five days later by Peking, makes the first specific reference to a possible effect of the BW campaign outside of Korea and China. A Japanese source is quoted as declaring that an unusual number of cases of dysentery and diarrhea have recently been noted in the port of Kobe, through which American troops returning from Korea pass in large numbers. The source said that this unusual incidence of a disease previously rare in Japan might well be the result of the BW being waged in Korea.

Korea Rejects WHO Aid: In a formal reply which fails to equal Moscow or Peking's general truculence on the subject, North Korean Foreign Minister Pak Hun Yong, addressing himself to U.N. Secretary General Trygve Lie, has rejected the offer of the World Health Organization to investigate sanitary conditions in North Korea. Pak's reply to the U.N. offer, which has not so far been broadcast by either Moscow or Peking, reiterates Korea's lack of faith in the impartiality of the WHO and repeats Moscow and Peking's contention that the organization has no international standing and is a servile lackey of the imperialists. In contrast, however, to the vicious denunciation of the organization as an espionage group for the Americans prevalent in Chinese and Soviet material, Pak stressed that the Koreans are perfectly capable of "preventing the spread of epidemics," and expressed confidence that the Koreans will be able "to check any vicious measures the enemy may take in the future." Pak made no attempt to demean Lie himself, which is in sharp contrast to the invective customarily directed against him by Chinese and Soviet sources. NCNA on 8 April described the U.N. Secretary General as an obedient tool of the BW criminals and in predicating that just punishment will be meted out to the U.S. aggressors, declared that "those who like Lie serve the

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interests of the U.S. aggressors cannot evade severe condemnation and punishment as their accomplices."

Peking generally continues its vehement denunciation of the WHO, with NCNA on 16 April describing the organization as "one of the U.N. specialized agencies which jumps at the crack of the State Department's whip," adding that "its real tasks have degenerated into espionage and white-washing for the U.S. Government. WHO Chairman Brook Chisholm also comes in for his share of abuse, being categorized as a renegade Canadian "who has a long record of promoting the Pentagon's bacteriological diplomacy."

Troops Ignorant of U.S. Use of BW: Peking has been making a special effort during the period under review to convince the world and U.N. forces in Korea that BW is being waged by the Americans even though the troops themselves may not realize it. London DAILY WORKER correspondent Alan Winnington declares on 11 April that "many ingenious methods have been devised by the Americans to deceive aircraft mechanics, bomb-handlers and technical workers into loading up bacteriological weapons in the belief that they are only loading up normal equipment." Winnington and other correspondents report methods by which ostensible flares, leaflet bombs and photo flash units have been secretly converted into BW disseminators without troop knowledge.

This attempt to prove that BW is being waged despite all indications to the contrary suggests that the Communists have been placed on the defensive and are extremely sensitive to the world-wide incredulity which has greeted the charges. This defensiveness is further indicated by frequent references to the failure of BW as an indication that all other unconventional weapons will similarly fail.

Stress on this topic, which may be a reaction to frequent Western references to new advanced weapons, is especially prevalent from Peking. NCNA on 10 April declares that the history of secret war-winning weapons-- "such as Hitler's new weapons and the Ishii bacterial bombs"--proves that such devices "are those of doomed societies gone mad, and however deadly can be met by free peoples and their scientists." And in what may be a response to some world-wide speculation that the BW charges stem from a desperate attempt to demean the United States and hide Communist weakness in Korea, there have been frequent attempts to reverse the direction of the interpretation by claiming that American recourse to biological warfare stems from military as well as moral weakness.

Pre-BW Themes Reappear as Campaign Slackens: As the general campaign of denunciation has abated, themes which characterized Communist treatment of the situation in Korea and the Korean war, but which had been largely eclipsed by the concentration on BW issues, have reappeared in increasing volume. The re-emergence of such themes was first noted from Peking almost three weeks ago, and Pyongyang and Moscow have now followed this

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pattern after a lag of about a week. All three transmitters now devote more attention to the actual military situation and the official communiques, and the latter have been considerably expanded from the recent terse references to minor "defensive" skirmishes and air-war successes. All three transmitters refer to tremendous American losses in men and materiel during the past two months and the individual exploits of Korean and People's Volunteer groups are again widely publicized.

Pyongyang has sharply increased the number of its allusions to Sino-Korean friendship and solidarity in Korea and there are now atypical references, especially in Korean, to the "increased Chinese enthusiasm to assist in our struggle." Pyongyang says further that the "Chinese Volunteers on the Korean front regard the war in Korea as a war in their own Fatherland, and the Korean people's liberation struggle as their own struggle in defense of freedom and independence." This new emphasis on Sino-Korean solidarity, which may reflect stress and strain among the battle partners, has not been noted from either Peking or Moscow.

Pyongyang also talks about the necessity for meeting home and battle-front needs, calls for more production and the development of transport facilities. There is extreme bluntness in declaring that victory "will elude the people unless present difficulties are overcome."

Another indication that all is not going too well in Korea and that problems of morale and popular resistance still plague the authorities is contained in Pyongyang's report of 15 April of a military trial held at Kaesong of enemy spies "who were spying out military secrets, disturbing our rear areas and sabotaging the solid bond between the military and the civilians." Ten thousand persons are said to have attended the trials and subsequent executions. Neither Peking nor Moscow has yet mentioned the trials.

Peking and Moscow join Pyongyang in reporting American theft and destruction of Korean art treasures and all three condemn American profiteering at the expense of American lives.

Soviet Participation a "Big Problem": After an extended period of relative amenability concerning the course of the truce negotiations, the slackening BW campaign has been accompanied in Peking's propaganda by a much more adamant note concerning the possibility of agreement on the three points obstructing an armistice. While stressing that agreement is still possible, Peking insists more frequently that a truce can be reached only if the Americans retreat from their "unreasonable" stand on truce inspectors, airfield construction and prisoner repatriation.

Western speculation that the Communists may be willing to give up their insistence upon the USSR as a member of the neutral inspection teams, and claims that the issue is being used as a bargaining lever in the hope of getting a U.S. concession on the question of airfield construction, are categorically rejected by Communist delegate Chang, who says that the

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Americans are wrong "in thinking that the neutral nations nomination is not a problem." Chang declares that whether this is a major point or not cannot be determined by the Americans unilaterally and that it is indeed "a very big question."

The American suggestion that four neutrals constitute the supervisory commission instead of six (which is generally considered as a measure which will permit the Chinese to withdraw their nomination of the Soviet Union gracefully and so save face) is declared by Chang to be "not helpful towards settling the question."

U.S. Optimism Over Talks Unwarranted: As another aspect of the hardening tone of comment related to the negotiations, Peking declares that the idle talk in the United States about the imminence of a truce has no basis in fact and that the rumors are intended as a fillip to the flagging morale of the American people and as a means of convincing the disgruntled American satellites that despite all indications something is being accomplished at Panmunjom.

Struggle Will Not End Until All Prisoners Are Returned: Equal intransigence is expressed concerning the repatriation of prisoners. PEOPLE'S DAILY says that the struggle in Korea cannot end until the goal of having all prisoners returned to a "peaceful and constructive life" is attained. American and British prisoners lend their voices to the demand that all prisoners must be returned, and Pyongyang reports Canadian displeasure with American violation of the Geneva convention relating to the return of war prisoners. This latter criticism has not yet been reported by either Peking or Moscow. Other comment stresses American stalling tactics as contrasted with Communist eagerness for a "reasonable solution."

One of the few recent references to Communist military capabilities is contained in the details of an interview with People's Volunteers Commander Peng Te-huai. Peng declares that the Americans are doomed to defeat no matter what they do. "If they go on fighting," he declares, "there is no victory possible for them, no way out. If they give in to peace, the monopoly capitalists will lose their rocketing profits and an economic crisis is upon them." Peng gave only passing mention to BW, describing it as a means of desperation which would not save the Americans from eventual defeat.

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